

Encrypted Traffic Analysis for Security & Compliance

FM OS 10.03.02



Table of contents

1. Executive Summary	3
2. Encrypted Traffic Analysis (ETA) Dashboard	3
3. FMC Profiles	4
3.1. TLS Server version reporting Use Case	4
3.2. Detection of Malware by JA3 fingerprints Use Case	6
4. ETA Analyses	8
4.1. Public key length and algorithm analysis Use Case	8
4.2. Server Name Indication (SNI) Analysis Use Case	9
5. Certificate checkup notification Use Case	10
6. FMC Chapters	11
7. Conclusions	12

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Encrypted Traffic Analysis (ETA) is a method of malware detection and cryptographic assessment of secured network sessions, which does not rely on decryption.

New research from Flowmon and IDG Connect shows 99% of IT managers recognize encrypted network traffic as a source of security risks, but two-thirds of businesses fail to protect their assets from both internal and external threats misusing SSL/TLS.

TLS (a successor to SSL) handshake is a non-encrypted session through which client and server negotiates the encryption rules. Only after a secure channel is established, the traffic becomes encrypted. By reading the handshake and its specific parameters we can identify unusual behaviour. Download the Whitepaper here.

2. ENCRYPTED TRAFFIC ANALYSIS (ETA) DASHBOARD

Flowmon Dashboard provide us single pane of glass for Network and Security Operation (NetOps and SecOps) with customizable or preconfigured templates widgets (applied from Configuration Center -> Configuration Templates). It is possible to create multiple Dashboards which present different view on the network information (e.g. one dashboard for network operation, other for security or encrypted traffic analyses and many more). Responsive design allows to view dashboard on mobile phones and tablets.




FIGURE: DASHBOARD USER INTERFACE

FIGURE 2: NEW DASHBOARD WIDGET SETUP

New Widget setup

1. Selection of a suitable pre-prepared chapter from Flowmon Monitoring Center (FMC -> Reports -> Chapters)
2. Type of Chart (Pie or Linear/Logarithmic)
3. Selection of time interval for data conversion
4. Number of TOP Time series in the chart and their values
5. Possibility of linear or logarithmic condition and colour of table

3. FMC PROFILES

3.1 TLS SERVER VERSION REPORTING USE CASE

TLS Server Version Report provide information about used [TLS Protocol versions](#) in whole monitored traffic (recommended parent FMC Profile is All Sources) with visibility into potential unsecure and vulnerable cryptography mechanism. It allows to show us lower TLS Protocol version than recommended TLS Protocol version for advanced security (e.g. TLS 1.0, TLS 1.1, TLS 1.2 or SSL versions).




FIGURE 3: TRAFFIC CHART WITH TLS PROTOCOL VERSIONS

Edit profile 'TLS server versions'

TLS server versions

Parent profile: All Sources

Group: ~No group~

Start date: 2020-02-08 09:50

End: ☒ Continuous profile

Maximal size: 1.00 GB

Expires: never

Type: ☒ Real ☐ Shadow

Granularity: ☒ 5 minutes ☐ 1 minute ☐ 30 seconds

Mass operations: ☒ Disabled channel ☐ Enabled channel

	NAME	CHANNEL OPTIONS	POSITION	ACTION
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	TLS 1.3		↑	✎ ✕
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	TLS 1.2		↑	✎ ✕
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	TLS 1.1		↑	✎ ✕
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	TLS 1.0		↑	✎ ✕

SAVE SAVE AS A NEW ITEM CANCEL

1. Profile name
2. Parent profile of source data for new profile
3. Group definition like “ETA”
4. Start date can be recalculated with history data
5. Expiration for data collection
6. “Real” type is with real data stored on disc and “Shadow” is about only data for graphing
7. Granularity for interval of collected data samples
8. Specification of unlimited count of channels

Edit channel 'TLS 1.3'

Channel: ☒ Enabled ☐ Disabled

Name: TLS 1.3

Position: Above the X-axis

Color:

Filter: `tls-svr "TLS 1.3"`

All channels: ☒ Selected channels: ☐

Selected channels:

- 127.128.0.0 (demo-flows...ast-1, NetFlow-port13000) ✕
- 127.0.0.1 (localhost, AWS VPC) ✕
- 127.128.0.0 (demo-flows-us-east-1, AWS VPC) ✕
- 10.0.0.22 (localhost) ✕
- localhost ✕

Parent channels (5)

+ Channel chart options

SAVE CLOSE

1. Position above or under X-axis
2. Every one channel is defined by filter
3. User can choose parent 's profile channels with concrete source data

FIGURE 4: FMC TLS SERVER VERSIONS PROFILE SETUP

3.2 DETECTION OF MALWARE BY JA3 FINGERPRINTS USE CASE

[JA3](#) is a much more effective way to detect malicious activity over SSL than IP or domain-based IOCs. Since JA3 detects the client application, it does not matter if malware uses DGA (Domain Generation Algorithms), or different IPs for each C2 host, or even if the malware uses Twitter for C2, as JA3 can detect the malware itself based on how it communicates, rather than what it communicates to. This is a straightforward way how to use Flowmon to find possible threats in connection with detecting specific JA3 fingerprints. In this Use case we have been used JA3 database: <https://ssllbl.abuse.ch/ja3-fingerprints/>

What is JA3 Fingerprint?

- Method describing encrypted communication between client and server
- Calculated during TLS handshake

How it works:

1. consists of headers from Client Hello message from TLS / SSL handshake
2. SSLVersion, Cipher, SSLExtension, EllipticCurve, EllipticCurvePointFormat respond 769,47-53-5-10-49161-49162-49171-49172-50-56-19-4,0-10-11,23-24-25,0
3. finally, MD5 hash is applied, which corresponds to the JA3 fingerprint de350869b8c85de67a350c8d186f11e6




FIGURE 5: CHART WITH TYPE OF MALICIOUS TRAFFIC BY JA3 FINGERPRINT


IMPORTANT NOTE

Bypassing proxy by camouflage of encrypted traffic:

- camouflage can be recognized by negotiated encryption, usually ciphers are proposed, which are generally recognized as compromised or already compromised
- communication to the Internet directed to compromised IP addresses, compromised HTTP hostname, SNI (name servers in the certificate), etc. Communication is detected by the BLACKLIST method in the ADS module.



In case of profile filter definition with JA3 fingerprints monitoring is not important how many fingerprints are used for the specific malware, it need to be used "OR" as separator between every `tls-ja3` parameter.



For relevant encrypted communication outputs where the TLS Handshake parameters are located, it is advisable to add one of the encrypted communication parameters, in our case “tls-sver”, without a value, to the filter.

4. ETA ANALYSES

4.1 PUBLIC KEY LENGTH AND ALGORITHM ANALYSIS USE CASE

Weak short keys and outdated algorithms are a serious security risk. [Insufficient key length](#) makes it easier for an attacker to perform brute force decryption. Outdated algorithms suffer from vulnerabilities malicious actors can exploit to break in (think Heartbleed). We should always check the key length and algorithm as one because different algorithms require different key lengths, for example, elliptic curve cryptography algorithms (ECC) have shorter keys while having equivalent key strength as RSA (RFC 4492):




FIGURE 9: TIME INTERVAL SELECTION

Also thanks to the visibility of the key length parameter or its algorithm, we are able to identify possible risks in the network, associated with this and resulting greater vulnerability due to simpler encryption. Based on the parameter used, it is also possible to create a chapter for the calculated data in the widget in the Flowmon dashboard.




FIGURE 10: TLS PUBLIC KEYLENGTH ANALYSIS




FIGURE 11: TLS PUBLIC ALGORITHM ANALYSIS

4.2 SERVER NAME INDICATION (SNI) ANALYSIS USE CASE

Similarly to ALPN, SNI is a TLS extension. It allows TLS-capable servers to host multiple services on the same IPs. Clients add this extension with the hostname of the website they want to connect to.




FIGURE 12: TLS SERVER SNI ANALYSIS

IMPORTANT NOTE

In case of data volume analysis in this way, the TOP10 results of the largest data volumes transmitted in communication with individual TLS server name (SNI) results. Based on the parameter used it is also possible to create a chapter for the calculated data in the widget in Flowmon dashboard.

5. CERTIFICATE CHECKUP NOTIFICATION USE CASE

While checking for expired certificates is an obvious step, we might also want to check for soon-to-be-expired certificates to prepare in advance. Furthermore, monitoring certificates and their usage in development, testing and production environments is a way to protect against and identify leaking private keys and other sensitive information.

Flowmon allow us to setup notification that the SSL certificate has expired and needs to be renew. For the purposes of notification, it is possible to use several combined actions, such as notification on an e-mail, run a user script or send a syslog to SIEM System.

Edit alert

Enabled ☒

Name The only valid characters are a-z, A-Z, 0-9, -, + and _

Profile

Filter

Channels ☒ All ☐ Only the selected Click to edit items

Conditions

- ☒ Conditions based on total flow summary
 - total flows
- ☐ Conditions based on individual Top 1 statistics

Trigger

Each time condition is true, and block the next trigger for cycles

Actions

☒ No action

Actions

☐ No action

☒ Send email

Recipient:

Subject:

Use GPG:

☐ Run script

☐ Send a syslog

☐ Send SNMP trap

1. Name of Alert
2. Parent profile like source of data
3. Additional filter as condition
4. Used channels from parent profile
5. Condition based on total flow summary
6. How many times is alert triggered
7. Actions may be combined

FIGURE 13: CERTIFICATE CHECKUP NOTIFICATION SETUP

6. FMC CHAPTERS

In the REPORTS tab in the left panel of the FMC module, it is possible to click through to the CHAPTERS section, where chapters are defined as a source of pre-calculated data, not only for reports, but also for the widgets in Flowmon Dashboard itself. These chapters can be fully utilized also for the purpose of monitoring encrypted traffic.




FIGURE 12: TLS SERVER SNI ANALYSIS

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ALLOWED	TLS Public key lenght	<input type="radio"/> TOP	<input type="button" value="EDIT"/>	<input type="button" value="DELETE"/>
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ALLOWED	TLS server name (SNI)	<input type="radio"/> TOP	<input type="button" value="EDIT"/>	<input type="button" value="DELETE"/>
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ALLOWED	TLS Signature algorithm	<input type="radio"/> TOP	<input type="button" value="EDIT"/>	<input type="button" value="DELETE"/>
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ALLOWED	TLS validity TO	<input type="radio"/> TOP	<input type="button" value="EDIT"/>	<input type="button" value="DELETE"/>

en cz jp de fr es X

Edit chapter

Name

TLS server name (SNI)

Description

TLS server name (SNI)

Profile

All Sources

Channels

☒ All
☐ Only the selected

Click to add items

Type

☒ Top chapter
☐ Traffic chapter

Top chapter - settings

Top

10

Base the statistics on the parameter

TLS server name (SNI)

Sort by

bytes

Chapter columns

none

none

none

bytes

Filter

Filter

Blacklist

<None>

+ NEW BLACKLIST

Recompute

do not recompute

FIGURE 15: TLS SEVER NAME (SNI) CHAPTER SETUP

1. Name and Description of Chapter
2. Source Profile of traffic data
3. Channels selection in profile
4. Type of Chapter (Pie or Linear/Logarithmic)
5. No. Of TOP values
6. Parameter statistics
7. Sort by value
8. Chapter columns description
9. Filter specification
10. Recomputing of data in time



7. CONCLUSIONS

99% of IT professionals see encrypted traffic as a possible source of security threats. Don't let the encrypted traffic turn into security risk. Gain a scalable visibility of threats in encrypted traffic when preserving privacy and with no impediment to latency for both, Network and Cloud Operation (NetOps) and Security Operation (SecOps) with Flowmon [Probes](#), Flowmon [Collectors](#) and Flowmon [ADS](#).